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STUDENT NOTES
CONSIDERATION-PERFORMANCE OF EXISTING LEGAL
OBLIGATION AS CONSIDERATION FOR A NEW
CONTRACT.
In discussing this problem it is necessary to deal with prior legal
obligation as consideration in the same manner as consideration is
dealt with in forming any original contract. The courts in rendering
their decisions have been content to base them upon the particular
phase of consideration that each case presents. One court emphasizes
benefit to the promisor, while another discusses primarily detriment
to the promisee. This accounts for a diversity of opinion as to what
really amounts to consideration.
It is the purpose of the writer to set forth the benefit to the prom-
isor and detriment to the promisee phases of consideration. A further
attempt will be made to show the interdependence of the two in con-
stituting consideration.
A common definition of consideration requires that it shall be either
a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor.' If this is
to be accepted as the correct definition without any further qualifica-
tion, it would seem that the two terms were intended to be used in the
alternative. This would enable either to serve as consideration.2
Accofding to this usage the case of McDevitt v. Stokes3 would have been
decided differently. In this case the Plaintiff McDevitt was bound by
contract to drive for one Shaw in the Kentucky futurity race for trot-
ting horses. The defendant Stokes promised to pay McDevitt one thou-
sand dollars if he would win the race with the particular horse he was
under contract to drive. Stokes owned the sire of that horse, and its
value would be increased by the winning of this race by the horse
ridden by Plaintiff. McDevitt won the race and he contended that the
benefit thus accruing to Stokes served as consideration for his promise
to pay the one thousand dollars. The Kentucky Court held that ful-
filling a prior legal obligation did not furnish consideration. This hold-
ing is in accord with the majority rule in the United States.'
The minority rule, however, is that performance of a prior legal
obligation constitutes consideration for a new contract. This holding
is based upon the fact that the promisor receives an economic benefit
I Temple v. Brooks, 165 App. Div. 661, 151 N. Y. S. 490 (1915);
McDevitt v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515, 192 S. W. 681 (1917).
2 Van Winkle v. King, 145 Ky. 691, 141 S. W. 46 (1911).
3174 Ky. 515, 192 S. W. 681 (1917).
4 See Day v. Gardner, 42 N. J. Eq. 199, 7 Atl. 365, 367 (1886).
STUDENT NoTEs
trom such performance.' This construction of the term "benefit" is
incorrect without a further qualification. "Benefit" means that the
promisor has In return for a promise acquired some legal right to
which he would not have been otherwise entitled.' The promisor may
receive an economic benefit from one's performance of an obligation.
But if that benefit would have accrued incidentally to performance of
a prior obligation it may be said that he is entitled to it whether or not
he makes a promise.
There Is another line of opinion concerning the performance or
promise of performance of a prior legal obligation as consideration.
It is based upon the contention that a party so bound has the privilege
of performing the obligation, or of breaching it and paying damages.'
The surrender of this right is viewed as furnishing consideration for a
new promise.8 This contention woud fall short as a general rule
because the promisee in any valid contract is entitled to the promisor's
fulfillment of his part of the contract. To hold otherwise would under-
mine the fundamental principle of contracts. If one is under contract
to do an act or forbearance in the future, it may be said that he is not
instantly legally bound to do the act. He is however obligated to hold
himself in readiness to perform when the time for performance arrives.
He may not of his own accord release himself from the obligation.
To breach the contract and pay damages would not be a release from
obligation." The damages to be paid may be assessed commensurate
with the loss sustained by the obligee. This loss would be equivalent
to the effect of non-performance. Whichever course the obligor pursues
carries with it a legal obligation of approximately an equal value.
Where one offers to fulfill an existing legal obligation as considera-
tion for a promise made by a third party, no benefit would be conferred
on the third party promisor by breaching and paying damages to the
original obligee. Such failure to confer a benefit would defeat the
idea of consideration based entirely upon benefit to the promisor.
Should one legally bound forego the assumed right to breach and pay
damages, he would still confer no benefit upon the third party promisor
that the latter would not have incidentally received. Williston points
out that to breach and pay damages is not a right, but a power of con-
tract.10
51 Williston, Contracts (1936) Sec. 131; Briskin v. Packard Motor
Co., 269 Mass. 394, 169 N. E. 148 (1929).
6 Page, Contracts (2d Edition 1920) See. 515; 1 Williston, Con-
tracts (Student Edition 1938) Sec. 102a.
' Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330 (N. Y. 1817).
s Sargent v. Robertson, 17 Ind. 411, 46 N. E. 925 (1897); Munroe v.
Perkins, 9 Pick. 298, 20 Am. Dec. 475 (1830); Tobin v. Kells, 207 Mass.
304, 93 N. E. 596 (1911); Restatement Law Contracts, Sec. 84(d):
"Consideration is not insufficient because of the fact the party giving
It Is then bound by a contractual or quasi contractual duty to a third
person to perform the act or forbearance given or promised as con-
sideration."
'3 Elliott, Contracts (1913) Sec. 2095.
" 1 Williston, Contracts (1936) Sec. 130.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Viewing consideration from the standpoint of a detriment to the
promisee, one already bound would suffer no actual loss by performing
his obligation. Such obligor has received or is to receive compensation
for performing his obligation. The compensation springs from the
transaction through which he became bound. It serves as an offset for
any inconvenience he may suffer as a result of performing the act or
forebearance.
A legal detriment need not be an actual pecuniary loss of some-
thing of present value." It may consist of a forbearance which would
be prejudicial to the promisee by effecting his reasonably anticipated
economic status for the future. It may consist of an act which the
promisee is not obliged to do." Anything that from its nature would
be a disadvantage to the party from which it moved would be a detri-
ment."
The terms "benefit" and "detriment", each used in relation to con-
sideration, contains an element of the other. A benefit to the promisor
would consist of something of value to the promisor, moving from the
promisee or a third person. The value thus accruing to the promisor
may not flow directly to him, but may flow to a third person." The
courts however place no less emphasis upon its validity as considera-
tion. The promisor has in that instance received something which
serves as consideration, founded upon the principle that he received
what he bargained for." The thing moving, in addition to moving to
the promisor or some third party, moves from the promisee or some
other party. But if it moves from a third party it may be said
that it does so upon the initiative of the promisee, or at least with
his sanction or approval. It matters not how insignificant the con-
sideration, or how slight the inconvenience to the promisee; if it Is
susceptible of legal estimation it serves as consideration."
Performance of an act which one is already legally bound to per-
form furnishes no consideration for a new contract with the original
promisor," nor with a third party.18
2"1 Williston, Contracts (1936) Sec. 446.
"1 Williston, Contracts (Student Ed. 1938) Sec. 102a; Pershall v.
Elliot, 249 N. Y. 183, 163 N. E. 554 (1923).
"Wallace v. Cook, 190 Ky. 262, 227 S. W. 279 (1921).
M Luigart v. Fed. Parquartry Mfg. Co., 194 Ky. 213, 238 S. W. 758
(1922).
5Bromfield v. Trinidad Nay. Inv. Co., 36 F. (2d) 646, 71 A. L R.
542 (1929); Williston, Contracts (Students Edition 1938) Sec. 113.
-Mullen v. Hawkins, 141 Ind. 363 (1895).
17 Blake v. Blake, 7 Iowa (7 Clarke) 46 (1858). (Held: A bona fide
agreement will be valid, no matter how insignificant the consideration,
or how slight the inconvenience or damage appears to be to the prom-
isee, provided it is susceptible of legal estimation.)
-Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328 (1865); Ford v. Crenshaw, 11 Ky.
(1 Litt.) 68 (1822).
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The writer contends that a valid consideration consists of a benefit
to the promisor to which he is not already entitled, and a detriment to
the promisee to which he is not already bound. Unless both these
factors are present, theke is no consideration, and a fortiorari no
contract.'
WnmaI R. KNucxL s
NEGLIGENCE: THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF
PHYSICIANS
The standard of care generally required by the courts in negligence
cases is the degree of care that would be exercised by a reasonable
prudent man under the circumstances. The standard of care required
of a physician is the care ordinarily exercised by an average physician
In good standing practicing in the same or similar locality.
1
The cases do not make it clear why this change has been made
regarding physicians. There is a close analogy in the law pertaining
to persons who are hindered with physical infirmities. The amount of
care required of such persons takes into account their defects. Instead
of holding that the physical defect is one of the circumstances, the
courts have called the attention of the jury to those defects directly by
requiring the standard of care as usually exercised by persons with like
infirmities.2 This departure from the general rule in the case of per-
sons with physical defects was evidently made to insure the jury's con-
sideration of these defects.
What then is the reason for the departure from the general rule
In the case of physicians? The physician is required to have spent
some time in preparing himself for his work. He is supposed to possess
more knowledge about the practice of medicine than the layman. It is
only fair then that the physician should be held to exercise a greater
amount of skill than the layman. This requirement could have been
fulfilled by requiring the degree of care exercised by a reasonable
prudent man under the circumstances, one of the circumstances being
that defendant is a physician. Such a standard however does not call
the attention of the jury directly enough to the special skill and learn-
ing of the defendent. In order to impress the jury with the fact that
defendent holds himself out to the public as a skilled man, the courts
could have required the exercise of the degree of care generally exer-
cised by an average physician. This requirement would have been
'Moore v. Kuster, 238 Ky. 292 (1931).
1 Dunnian v. Raney, 118 Ark. 337, 176 S. W. 339 (1915); Whitsell v.
v, Hill, 101 Iowa 630, 70 N. W. 750 (1899); Wilks v. Black, 188 Mich.
478, 154 N. W. 561 (1915); Hales v. Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130 S. W.
425 (1910).
,Ham v. City of Lewiston, 94 Maine 265, 47 Atl. 548 (1900); Carter
V, Village of Nunda, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1059, 55 App. Div. 501 (1900).
Plaintiff however in going about public places alone was called upon
to exercise such reasonable care and caution for his own safety as an
ordinary prudent person with a like infirmity would have exercised.
